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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STA1,E OF UTAH 
l'viARGIE l\'l. JEPPSON. sometimes 
known as r.~JARGIE l\1. JEPPSON 
EDGEL. 
Plaintiff anrl Respondent, 
us. 
EivlELIA LARSON JEPPSON. 
Defendant and Appellant, C~se No. 81353 
and THORA JEPPSON SPILKER. 
ERVIN F. JEPPSON. ALTA 
JEPPSON JENSEN. OVID A. 
JEPPSON. RUTH JEPPSON 
SJOSTRON and NORDA JEPPSON. 
Intervening Defendants, 
Brief of Respondent 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the statement of facts by defendant-appellant does 
not give a complete picture of the case as presented to the 
trial court. the plaintiff-respondent here files her statement 
of additional facts. 
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The defendant and all of the intervening defendants 
by their pleadings defended this action upon the ground that 
the plaintiff was a trustee. (Tr. 12,13,14). Such was the 
contention at the pre-trial. (Tr. 33). Upon the trial that theory 
was abandoned and the defendant-appellant alone defended 
upon the ground that she retained an interest in the premises 
as a surviving widow under our statutes. ( T r. 77,78). 
It appeared from the evidence of both parties that the 
defendant-appellant and her nominee received from the re-
spondent upon three separate occasions conveyances to three 
different portions of the original tract purchased by the plaintiff-
respondent, a portion of which tract is the subject 
of this action. (Tr. 83,86). The portions conveyed were de-
signated by the appellant. (Tr. 87}. The appellant in her 
statement of facts contends that such conveyances were with-
out consideration, but respondent offered evidence that such 
conveyances were executed and accepted in satisfaction of 
appellant's purported claim to an undivided interest in the 
whole of such real property. (Tr. 86,7). 
Appellant's deposition was received at the trial by stipu- ) 
lation. ( T r. 138) . It appears therefrom that the premises in I 
question were purchased by the decedent, Ephraim Jeppson. 
in his lifetime, and that such purchase price was paid in part 
by a mortgage executed by the decedent, his wife who is the 
appellant, and others. (Page 44 of Deposition}. This mort-
gage was refinanced by a mortgage to Home Owners' Loan 
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Corporation executed by the appellant as administratrix ( Ap-
pellants Petition to lYiortgage in Probate File) which said 
mortgage was assumed and paid by the respondent. 
(Tr. 32. 33). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR QUESTIONS 
ARGUED 
(A) \VAS THE WIDO\V'S INTEREST DIVEST-
ED BY THE PROBATE SALE? 
(B) IS THE WIDOW NOW BARRED ANDES-
TOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH RIGHT IF SUCH 
RIGHT WAS NOT DIVESTED? 
ARGUMENT 
(A) Respondent does not concede that as a general 
proposition a widow's interest in real property should be re-
garded as continuing despite a valid. duly confirmed probate 
sale of the premises in her deceased spouse's estate. But as 
wilJ be hereinafter noted, there are circumstances herein which 
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4 
should be considered if such general proposition is assumed 
as contended by appellant. 
Appellant relies upon (a) the dicta of this court in cases 
which involve questions of taxation and (b) decisions which 
state rules regarding common law dower. In none of the cases 
cited by the appellant from this court was the proposition 
advanced by her before the court for decision, and it is sub-
mitted that the statute under consideration has never been 
construed in so far as the questions here under consideration 
are concerned. 
As is pointed out by the annotations to ·our 1943 Utah 
Code, Section 101-4-3, was originally taken in part from 
McClain's Annotated, Statutes of Iowa, 1888, No. 3644, and 
incorporated in the Utah Statutes in the year 1898. In re 
Reynold's Estate, 90 U. 415, 421, 62 P. 2nd 270. The 
corresponding section of the 1939 Code of Iowa is No. 11990. 
Such later section of the Iowa code differs materially from our 
section in that the Utah Code limits the types of debts of the 
decedent to which the statutory interest is expressly subject, 
but it is felt that a brief reference to the Iowa decisions will be 
helpful since the language in our section is in part 
the same. 
Under the Iowa decisions, a widow who received proper 
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notice of a probate proceeding to sell the real pr~perty of her 
deceased husband. must set up her rights, if any, in that 
proceeding, and cannot thereafter claim any interest in the 
property sold. 1 Annotation to Code of Iowa, 1939, 1784. 
Sec. 118. Re: Estate of Pennock. 122 Iowa 622. 98 N\V 
Attention of the court is invited to the grammatical con-
struction of the statute u~der consideration, and particularly 
to the form and tense of the verbs used. 10 1-4-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, reads in part: "one-third in value * * * 
shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives 
him * * * . " (Italics added) . It is submitted that the form of 
the verbs implies some affirmative act of the probate court 
in awarding her "one-third in value," and that the tense of the 
verbs seems to indicate an interval of time between the fact of 
survivorship and the fact of such award of real property. If 
this particular section is so construed according to its gram-
matical construction, appellant's only complaint would be that 
the probate court failed to make a proper award to her, and it 
is now far too late to complain of what the said probate court 
did or did not do, even assuming that such complaint would 
be well founded. 
As to appellant's citations concerning the general rules 
affecting dower rights, the following considerations are sub-
mitted for the consideration of the court: 
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As was said in the case of Scott v. Wells, 56 N\V 828, 
at page 829: 
"In various opinions in this court the estate which 
a widow takes in the lands of her deceased husband 
has been to some extent likened to dower. It has been 
said to be 'in the nature of dower,' 'an enlargement 
of dower,' etc. Such expressions are apt to be mis-
leading. They suggest a likeness between things es-
sentially dissimilar. The only particular in which 
common-law dower and the estate that now goes to the 
widow resemble each other is that the same person 
takes * * * ." 
However, it is felt that a closer examination of the rules 
of common law dower should be made, as such rules might be 
of some help in the disposition of this appeal. 
Appellant quoted an excerpt from 24 Corpus Juris 684 
to' the effect that dower generally is not divested by. an adminis- j 
tration sale. That rule is further explained in the corresponding 
section appearing in 34 Corpus Juris Secundum 615, Section ) 
637, which adds: "although the reversion of lands assigned or l 
set apart as dower may pass by such a sale." The quoted words 
make it clear that the text refers to a situation where a widow 
has been awarded a common law dower, not to a situation 
where she might receive a statutory fee simple interest such as 
is here under discussion. 
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l\'loreover the same section. 34 Corpus Juris Secundum 
616. Section 637, makes this further qualification: "a sale 
to satisfy a debt to which the dower estate is subject 
discharges dmver * * * . '' 
The ""idow' s statutory interest is made expressly subject 
by the terms of Utah Code Annotated. Section lOl-4-3, to 
debts ''created- for the purchase thereof.'' As will appear from 
the statement of facts, the purchase of the :gremises in the 
probate court was made in part by the assumption of a Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation mortgage which was a direct re-
newal of a purchase money mortgage. 
Furthermore, this appellant, the surviving widow, joined 
in the purchase money mortgage which was renewed as afore-
said. Apart from considerations as to the purpose of the 
mortgage, the wife's interest was inferior to the lien of the re-
newal mortgage even though she did not join in the execution 
of the latter. Tracy Loan and Trust Company v. Luke, et al. 
72 Utah 231, 269 Pac. 780. 
(B) IS THE WIDOW NOW BARRED ANDES-
TOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH RIGHTS IF 
SUCH RIGHTS ARE ASSUIVIED NOT TO HAVE 
BEEN DIVESTED BY THE PROBATE SALE? 
Upon such assumption, the parties to this action became, 
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after the probate sale. tenants in common as to the whole of 
the property sold. The appellant owned and held an undivided 
one-third interest and the respondent owned and held an un-
divided two-thirds interest. Thereafter, the appellant received 
deeds to separate portions of the. said land. 
In 4 Thompson on Real Property 474, Section 1962, 
there appears the general rule: 
''It is well settled that co-owners of land may, 
by a bona fide mutual agreement among themselves. 
make a division thereof so as to sever their interests 
\Vithout going through the ordeal of a trial by proof in 
court as to title.'' 
The next section, 1963 further states the rule. and in part 
reads: 
''Where several members of a family effect a 
partition by deeds among. themselves, it will not be 
disturbed unless it appears that substantial inequalities 
exist to the detriment of the interest of some.'' 
The appellant here does not contend that she-has received J 
an inequitable portion of the premises, but insists that the , 
former deeds were wholly without consideration, and that she 
should now receive an undivided third of all of the premises 
remaining. 
It is submitted that the finding of the court that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
appellant is · · no\Y barred and estopped from asserting any 
interest of. in or to the premises retained by the respondent" 
is supported by the evidence. 
\ \'HEREFORE, the respondent prays that the judge-
ment be affirmed with costs assessed against the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAMOREAUX & TUFT 
RUSSELL & LIVINGSTON 
.Attorneys /or Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Due service of two copies of foregoing Brief of Re-
spondent acknowledged this ------------------------ day of January, 
A. D. 1949. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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